

ARAB LEAGUE

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KCMUN

ARAB LEAGUE

STUDY GUIDE

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Agenda Item:

2011 Arab Spring

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1. Letter from the Secretary General

Firstly, it is with immense pride and enthusiasm that I extend my warmest welcomes to all participants of the Kırmızı Çizgi High Schools Model United Nations Conference 2026, taking place on July 20th-21st-22nd in Antalya.

I am Güney Deniz Ala, Secretary-General of this distinguished conference. It is both an honor and a privilege to lead this organization in this position. Model United Nations has always been far more than a simulation, it is a journey. Whether you're a more experienced delegate or a first-timer, with KCMUN'26 I promise unparalleled growth and inspiration.

Our Academic Team: Under-Secretary Generals, Academic Assistants, and Board Members, represent the finest minds in Antalya, each meticulously selected to deliver your committees of exceptional caliber. From beginner to advanced committees, every session has been crafted for the maximum impact. My deepest gratitude goes to my fellow executive team Can Kurnaz, Berkcan Şahin, Mert Sürücü, Erdem Demirci and Çağın Orkan Benzeş, whose unwavering support made this vision reality.

I extend special thanks to the KCMUN'26 participants, whose passion set the standard we strive to exceed.

As we gather, let us draw inspiration from the eternal words of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, founder of modern Turkey: “Ey Türk gençliği! Birinci vazifen, Türk istiklâlini, Türk Cumhuriyeti’ni, ilelebet muhafaza ve müdafaa etmektir. Mevcudiyetinin ve istikbalinin yegâne temeli budur. Bu temel, senin en kıymetli hazinendir.”

To delegates: embrace the challenge, defend your interests, and leave KCMUN'26 having elevated your voice on the world stage. I am eager to witness your brilliance. Sincerely,

Güney Deniz Ala

Secretary-General, KCMUN'26

2. Letter from the Under-Secretaries General

Dear delegates, distinguished academic team and fellow participants;

We are honored to welcome you all to the first annual Kırmızı Çizgi Anatolian High School Model United Nations Conference (KCMUN'26). As Doruk ŞENTÜRK and Baran İNCE, it's a pleasure to serve you as an Under Secretaries-General of the ARAB LEAGUE committee. We were 12th grade students in Maya Science and Technology High School & Bahçeşehir Parkorman Campus Anatolian High School and we graduated.

In the early months of 2011 a wave of social unrest swept across the Arab world as people protested against repressive and authoritarian regimes, economic stagnation, unemployment and corruption. It began with reaction to the self-immolation of a young market trader in Tunisia, but soon became an outpouring of resentment after generations of fear. In this special committee, the representatives are going to argue and make an agreement about the topic of the Arab Spring.

Lastly, we want to thank the executive team, Güney Deniz Ala, Erdem Demirci and Çağın Orkan Benzeş, for giving us an opportunity to serve as under secretaries general in this delightful conference. We cannot wait to meet all of you personally and we hope you can have a great time with the time you spend in the conference. You can contact us at any kind of situation or problem, do not hesitate to ask us any questions about the committee. See you soon!

Sincerely,

Doruk ŞENTÜRK & Baran İNCE
Under Secretaries-General of ARAB LEAGUE

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3. Introduction

3.1. Introduction to the Arab League

The Arab League (Arabic: الجامعة العربية, al-Jāmi‘a al-‘Arabiyya), officially the League of Arab States (Arabic: جامعة الدول العربية, Jāmi‘at ad-Duwal al-‘Arabiyya), is a regional organisation in the Arab world. The Arab League was formed in Cairo on 22 March 1945, initially with seven members: Egypt, Iraq, Transjordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and North Yemen. Currently, the League has 22 members.

The League's main goal is to "draw closer the relations between member states and co-ordinate collaboration between them, to safeguard their independence and sovereignty, and to consider in a general way the affairs and interests of the Arab countries". The organisation has received a relatively low level of cooperation throughout its history.

Through institutions, notably the Arab League Educational, Cultural and Scientific Organization (ALECSO) and the Economic and Social Council of its Council of Arab Economic Unity (CAEU), the League facilitates political, economic, cultural, scientific, and social programmes designed to promote the interests of the Arab world. It has served as a forum for the member states to coordinate policy, arrange studies of and committees as to matters of common concern, settle inter-state disputes and limit conflicts such as the 1958 Lebanon crisis. The League has served as a platform for the drafting and conclusion of many landmark documents promoting economic integration. One example is the Joint Arab Economic Action Charter, which outlines the principles for economic activities in the region.

Each member state has one vote in the Council of the Arab League, and decisions are binding only for those states that have voted for them. The aims of the league in 1945 were to strengthen and coordinate the political, cultural, economic and social programmes of its members and to mediate disputes among them or between

them and third parties. Furthermore, the signing of an agreement on Joint Defence and Economic Cooperation on 13 April 1950 committed the signatories to coordination of military defence measures. In March 2015, the Arab League General Secretary announced the establishment of a Joint Arab Force with the aim of counteracting extremism and other threats to the Arab States. The decision was reached while Operation Decisive Storm was intensifying in Yemen. Participation in the project is voluntary, and the army intervenes only at the request of one of the member states. Existing military cooperation between Arab league states and regional civil wars and terrorist threats were the impetuses for JAF's establishment.

In the early 1970s, the Economic Council put forward a proposal to create the Joint Arab Chambers of Commerce across international states. That led to the setting up of mandates to promote, encourage and facilitate bilateral trade between the Arab world and significant trading partners.

3.2. Mandate and Decision-Making Structure

The principal Arab League institutions are: The Council of the League, The Secretariat General, The Joint Defence Council, The Economic and Social Council, The Committees.

The Council

The Charter of Arab League (1945) in art. 3 establishes the Council of the Arab League which is composed of the representatives of the Member-States of the League. The Council has become the supreme organ of the Arab League, some of its main tasks, underlined in the same, article of the founding treaty of the Arab League, are to achieve the realisation of the objectives of the League and deciding upon the means by which the League has to co-operate with international bodies in order to guarantee the security, peace, regulate economic and social relations.

The Council holds ordinary sessions twice a year, but at the request of two member States, extraordinary sessions can also be held whenever circumstances demand. The meetings of the Council, as stated in the Internal Regulations of the Council (1951) are secret, except those cases when the Council decides by a majority of votes to make them public.

Each Member State has one vote in the League Council, while the decisions, taken by a majority voting in the Council, are binding only for those states that have voted for them.

The Secretariat-General

The Secretariat General is the institution of the Arab League responsible for implementing decisions taken by the Council of the League. It is a permanent institution consisting of the Secretary-General, Assistant Secretaries and a number of officials. The Council of the League can appoint the Secretary General and this, in his turn, appoint the Assistant Secretaries and the principal officials of the League. The Secretary General has the rank of an Ambassador, representing the Arab League at the international level, while the Assistant Secretaries have the role of Ministers Plenipotentiary.

The first Secretary-General of the Arab League was Dr. Abd El Rahman Azzam from Egypt serving the post from 1945 to 1952. The present Secretary-General is Mr. Ahmed Aboul-Gheit (Egypt). He is the 8th head of the League Secretariat General from its establishment, and was elected in 2016.

The Secretary-General has a key role as he prepares the draft of the budget of the League, submits it to the Council for approval and then takes the appropriate measures for managing this budget.

The Secretary-General also fixes the precise date of each of the ordinary sessions of the Council or convenes the meetings of the permanent

Committees, prepares the draft agenda of the Council and communicates it to the Member States, attends the meetings of the Council and makes reports and declarations on the subjects discussed within these meetings.

The Joint Defence Council

The Joint Defence Council was set up after the signing of the Treaty of Joint Defence and Economic Cooperation Between the States of the Arab League in June 1950. It is composed of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Defence from all the member states. The initial signatory States were Jordan, Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Egypt and Yemen and according to the art. 2 of the Treaty, “any act of armed aggression made against any one of them, to be directed against them all. Therefore, in accordance with the rights of self-defence, they undertake to go without delay to the aid of the State or States against such an act of aggression is made, and immediately to take, individually and collectively, all steps available, including the use of armed force, to repel the aggression and restore security and peace. In conformity with art. 6 of the Arab League Pact and art. 51 of the United Nations Charter, the Arab League Council and U. N. Security Council shall be notified of such acts of aggression and the means and procedure taken to check it.”

The Joint Defence Council under the supervision of the Arab League Council has the role to deal with all the matters concerning the implementations of this article among others.

The Economic and Social Council

The Economic and Social Council was set up to replace the Economic Council which had been created at the provisions of the Treaty in June 1950. Its aim is to establish the objectives of, and to promote the means for the economic and social development of the Arab world. It also coordinates the activities of the specialized agencies set up in the framework of the Arab League. Among the most important of these are the Arab Fund for Economic and Social

Development, the Arab Monetary Fund, the Arab Organization for Agricultural Development, the Arab Labour Council, and the Council for Arab Unity.

The Committees

In order to give concrete implementation of the common objectives of the Arab League listed in the art. 2 of the foundation Charter, the art. 4 established the creation of the special committees of the Arab League, which fell up in three categories: one category is set up by the main institutions of the League to assist the sessions so the lifetime of these Committees is linked to the timing of that specific Session, the “ad hoc” Committees are responsible for carrying out specific tasks and they are dissolved when their mandate has been carried out. The Permanent Committees play a crucial role within the League, they act in a specific sphere of competence with a variety of functions. There are Permanent Committees for political matters, social questions, health, culture, economic matters, information, oil, finance and administration.

The Arab Human Rights Committee was established after the entering into force of the Arab Charter on Human Rights in 2008 (having the necessary seventh ratification) to supervise its implementation, as mentioned in the article. 45 of the Charter.

4. Background to the Arab Spring

4.1. Political, Economic, and Social Conditions before 2011

There has been much analysis of the causes and rapid spread of the 2011 Arab Spring (or Arab uprisings). General consensus emerges on a combination of political, economic and social factors as being critical. These can be divided into: a) structural, long-standing, underlying factors that led to a build-up of popular anger and frustration in Arab countries; and b) proximate, more

immediate factors that transformed localised protests into nationwide movements, and fanned uprisings across the region.

The key findings in the literature include:

Structural factors:

- The breakdown of the ‘authoritarian bargain’ or exclusionary social contract, whereby the state provided services, employment and food-energy subsidies in return for political support (or compliance), was the overarching reason for loss of legitimacy by Arab regimes and popular anger against them.
- A population explosion in the Arab world coupled with government failures to carry out structural reforms and create jobs, led to rising unemployment, in particular youth unemployment. Improvements in education levels across the region contributed to raised expectations among young people – and frustration when public sector jobs were no longer available, and those in the private sector were low-paid or unsuited to their skills.
- Austerity measures introduced as a result of structural adjustment programmes, and the impact of the global financial crisis, led to rising prices (particularly food prices), economic hardship and deteriorating living standards for the majority of people.
- Corruption by ruling elites and their cronies was carried out both on a larger scale and in a far more blatant fashion, further widening income inequality. The sharp contrast between the struggles of ordinary people and the luxuries enjoyed by corrupt elites fuelled public anger.
- The ‘authoritarian contract’ led to the emergence of a substantial middle class in Arab countries, but they saw their quality of life deteriorate as the contract broke down. Statistics on life satisfaction show that, by the end of the 2000s, people in Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen were among the least happy people in the world.
- Authoritarian regimes were characterised by consolidation of power in the hands of a few; denial of fundamental rights such as freedom of expression and of organisation; use of violence to suppress opposition and massive abuses of human rights. Moreover, as the exclusionary social contract broke

down, regimes became more dependent on repression and violence. Greater access to information and awareness, including of individual cases of blatant human rights abuses by the security services, led to widespread anger and a sense of injustice.

- Public anger and frustration at the lack of jobs, denial of rights, corruption, inequality and so on, fuelled a desire to restore individual and national dignity (*karama*).

Proximate factors:

- Electronic information networks and social media played a critical role in raising awareness of abuses (notably Muhammed Bouazizi's self-immolation which triggered the Tunisia uprising), mobilising protesters, and in sustaining action and 'defeating' the security services during the uprisings.
- There was a definite demonstration effect driving the Arab Spring, evident from the speed with which uprisings followed each other across the region, as people saw what was happening in other countries and were inspired to follow suit.
- Blunders in state response, in particular using a heavy-handed approach and trying to crush opposition, had the reverse effect of galvanising more people to join the protests.
- The armed forces played a decisive role in many of the Arab uprisings, particularly the early ones in Tunisia and Egypt. In both countries the army opted to side with the people, forcing Ben Ali and Mubarak to step down. In Libya, by contrast, the army split along regime and opposition lines leading to civil war. In Syria, the core of the army remained loyal to the Assad regime, resulting in ongoing conflict.
- The protests were not ideological, were not led by political parties or indeed any leading figures, and generally started spontaneously. The demand for regime change and social justice had inclusive appeal, uniting people from different groups in society. The grassroots nature and scale of popular mobilisation made it difficult for regimes to take effective action against

them.

4.2. **Mohamed Bouazizi**

Tarek El-Tayeb Mohamed Bouazizi (Arabic: طارق الطيب محمد البوعزيزي, romanized: Ṭāriq aṭ-Ṭayīb Muḥammad al-Būʿazīzī; 29 March 1984 – 4 January 2011) was a Tunisian street vendor who, in response to the confiscation of his wares as well as the harassment and humiliation inflicted by municipal officials and their aides, set himself on fire on 17 December 2010 in Sidi Bouzid, Tunisia. His act of self-immolation was the most immediate cause of the Tunisian Revolution, which was the first revolution in the wider Arab Spring against autocratic regimes. Simmering public anger and sporadic violence intensified following Bouazizi's death, leading the then-president of Tunisia Zine El Abidine Ben Ali to step down on 14 January 2011, after 23 years in power. The success of the Tunisian protests inspired protests in several other Arab countries, plus several non-Arab countries, such as in China. The protests included several men who emulated Bouazizi's act of self-immolation, in an attempt to bring an end to their own autocratic governments. Those men and Bouazizi were hailed by New York Times commentators as "heroic martyrs of a new North African and Middle Eastern revolution". In 2011, Bouazizi was posthumously awarded the Sakharov Prize jointly along with four others for his and their contributions to "historic changes in the Arab world". The Tunisian government honored him with a postage stamp. The Times of the United Kingdom named Bouazizi as "Person of 2011", The Jerusalem Post's Amotz Asa-El named him "Person of the Jewish Year 5771" and "The Protester" was named Time 2011 Person of the Year.

4.3. **The Regional Spread of Protests**

In this second Arab spring, it is apparent that the euphoria of the opening phase, while well deserved, was somewhat premature. With Tunisia's Ben Ali and Egypt's Mubarak falling after just weeks of protests, there was a sense that "it could happen anywhere – and just as quickly." But Arab

autocrats have redoubled their efforts, growing both more stubborn and more emboldened in their efforts to preserve power. The lesson many of them seemed to learn from Egypt and Tunisia was almost the exact opposite of what democracy advocates were hoping for. Ben Ali and Mubarak used force (at least 380 people were killed in Egypt) and lost. Perhaps, then, leaders would learn to pre-empt opposition demands by granting early concessions. Instead, in countries like Bahrain, Syria, and Saudi Arabia, they have granted fewer concessions while using even more force. Shooting into crowds has become frighteningly common. Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, is enthusiastically adopting the dubious role of leader of the Arab “counter-revolution”. These revolutions, then, will take longer than was expected. Still, it’s worth remembering the main lesson of this opening period: autocracies don’t last forever. They are stable – until they’re not. And then it’s too late. Even if regimes manage to hold on to power, their stability is no longer guaranteed. With a new “protest ethic” taking hold in the region, the threat of the next revolt is now always present. The model is devastatingly simple: bring enough people into the streets and overwhelm the regime with sheer numbers. “No state”, observed sociologist Charles Kurzman, “can repress all of the people all of the time.” In contrast to the courage of Arab protesters is the relative timidity and incoherence of the international community’s response to the changes underway. The west’s “stability paradigm” – the notion that interests could be exchanged for ideals – has collapsed under the weight of its inherent contradictions. While the intervention in Libya helped western nations gain some Arab goodwill, many in the Arab world are waiting to see if they will consistently apply the “responsibility to protect” with allied countries, such as Bahrain and Yemen, where civilians are clearly in need of protection. No one is asking for another military intervention, but what about putting real political pressure on regimes to respect opposition demands? With the region’s various political stalemates, the role of external actors is – for better or worse – likely only to grow.

5. Major National Developments

Arab Spring, wave of pro-democracy protests and uprisings that took place in the Middle East and North Africa beginning in 2010 and 2011, challenging some of the region's entrenched authoritarian regimes. The wave began when protests in Tunisia and Egypt toppled their regimes in quick succession, inspiring similar attempts in other Arab countries. Not every country saw success in the protest movement, however, and demonstrators expressing their political and economic grievances were often met with violent crackdowns by their countries' security forces. For detailed coverage of the Arab Spring in individual countries, see Jasmine Revolution (Tunisia), Egypt Uprising of 2011, Yemen Uprising of 2011–12, Libya Revolt of 2011, and Syrian Civil War.

5.1. Tunisia's Jasmine Revolution



The first demonstrations took place in central Tunisia in December 2010, catalyzed by the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi, a 26-year-old street vendor protesting his treatment by

local officials. A protest movement, dubbed the “Jasmine Revolution” in the media, quickly spread through the country. The Tunisian government attempted to end the unrest by using violence against street demonstrations and by offering political and economic concessions. However, protests soon overwhelmed the country's security forces, compelling Pres. Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali to step down and flee the country on January 14, 2011. In October 2011, Tunisians participated in a free election to choose members of a council tasked with drafting a new constitution. A democratically chosen president and prime minister took office in December 2011, and a new constitution was promulgated in January 2014. In October–November 2019, Tunisia became

the first country of the Arab Spring protests to undergo a peaceful transfer of power from one democratically elected government to another.

5.2. Egypt's January 25 Revolution



Inspired by Ben Ali's ouster in Tunisia, similar protests were quickly organized among young Egyptians through social media (see Wael Ghonim), bringing out massive crowds across Egypt on January 25. The Egyptian government also tried and

failed to control protests by offering concessions while cracking down violently against protesters. After several days of massive demonstrations and clashes between protesters and security forces in Cairo and around the country, a turning point came at the end of the month when the Egyptian army announced that it would refuse to use force against protesters calling for the removal of Pres. Hosni Mubarak. Having lost the support of the military, Mubarak left office on February 11 after nearly 30 years, ceding power to a council of senior military officers. The military enjoyed high public approval in the interim before a new government, but its apparent prioritization of stability over democratic transition at times dampened optimism.

5.3. Yemen

In Yemen, where the first protests appeared in late January 2011, Pres. Ali Abdullah Saleh's base of support was damaged when a number of the country's most powerful tribal and military leaders aligned themselves with the pro-democracy protesters calling for him to step down. When negotiations to

remove Saleh from power failed, loyalist and opposition fighters clashed in Sanaa. Saleh left Yemen in June to receive medical treatment after he was injured in a bomb attack, raising hopes among the opposition that a transition would begin. Saleh returned to the country unexpectedly four months later, however, adding to the uncertainty and confusion about Yemen's political future. In November 2011 Saleh signed an internationally mediated agreement calling for a phased transfer of power to the vice president, Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi. In accordance with the agreement, Hadi took over governing responsibility immediately and formally assumed the presidency after standing as the sole candidate in a presidential election in February 2012. Unable to improve conditions or maintain stability, however, Hadi's government faced armed confrontation and rebellion that in 2014 devolved into a civil war.

5.4. Bahrain



Mass protests demanding political and economic reforms erupted in Bahrain in mid-February 2011, led by Bahraini human rights activists and members of Bahrain's marginalized Shi'i

majority. Protests were violently suppressed by Bahraini security forces, aided by a Gulf Cooperation Council security force (composed of about 1,000 soldiers from Saudi Arabia and 500 police officers from the United Arab Emirates) that entered the country in March. By the end of the month, the mass protest movement had been stifled. In the aftermath of the protests, dozens of accused protest leaders were convicted of antigovernment activity and imprisoned, hundreds of Shi'i workers suspected of supporting the protests were fired, and dozens of Shi'i mosques were demolished by the government. In November 2011 an independent investigation into the uprising, commissioned by the Bahraini government, concluded that the government had used excessive force and torture against protesters. The government carried out some of the commission's recommendations for reform but

clamped down further on opposition groups in the years that followed.

5.5. Libya



In Libya protests against the regime of Muammar al-Qaddafi in mid-February 2011 quickly escalated into an armed revolt. When the rebel forces appeared to be on the verge of defeat in March, an international

coalition led by NATO launched a campaign of air strikes targeting Qaddafi's forces. Although NATO intervention ultimately shifted the military balance in favour of the rebel forces, Qaddafi was able to cling to power in the capital, Tripoli, for several more months. He was forced from power in August 2011 after rebel forces took control of Tripoli. After evading capture for several weeks, Qaddafi was killed in Sirte in October 2011 as rebel forces took control of the city. A Transitional National Council, set up by rebel forces and recognized internationally, took power, but its struggle to exert authority over the country precipitated the outbreak of civil war in 2014.

5.6. Syria

In Syria protests calling for the resignation of Pres. Bashar al-Assad broke out in southern Syria in mid-March 2011 and spread through the country. The Assad regime responded with a brutal crackdown against protesters, drawing condemnation from international leaders and human rights groups. A leadership council for the Syrian opposition formed in Istanbul in August, and opposition militias began to launch attacks on government forces. In spite of the upheaval, Assad's hold on power appeared strong, as he was able to retain the support of critical military units composed largely of members of Syria's 'Alawite minority, to which Assad also belonged. Meanwhile, divisions in the international community made it unlikely that

international military intervention, which had proved decisive in Libya, would be possible in Syria. Russia and China vetoed UN Security Council resolutions meant to pressure the Assad regime in October 2011 and February 2012 and vowed to oppose any measure that would lead to foreign intervention in Syria or Assad's removal from power. The arrival of a delegation of peace monitors from the Arab League in December 2011 did little to reduce violence. The escalation of violence, fed by funding and arms from several rival countries interested in the outcome of the situation, culminated in a devastating civil war and a massive refugee crisis affecting millions.

5.7. Other Countries

The effects of the Arab Spring movement were felt elsewhere throughout the Middle East and North Africa as many of the countries in the region experienced at least minor pro-democracy protests. In Algeria, Jordan, Morocco, and Oman, rulers offered a variety of concessions, ranging from the dismissal of unpopular officials to constitutional changes, in order to head off the spread of protest movements in their countries.

6. The Role of the Arab League

6.1. Mediation and Diplomatic Action

According to the league's charter, the founding members of the Arab League—Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Transjordan, and Yemen—agreed to seek “close cooperation” on matters of economics, communication, culture, nationality, social welfare, and health. They renounced violence as a means to settle conflicts between members and empowered league offices to mediate in such disputes, as well as in conflicts involving nonmembers. Signatories agreed to collaborate in military affairs; this accord was strengthened with a 1950 pact committing members to treat acts of aggression against any member state as an act against all.

The charter established the Arab League headquarters in Cairo, created a permanent General Secretariat, and scheduled sessions to meet biannually, or at the request of two members in extraordinary circumstances. A formal commitment to international human rights law entered league conventions in 2004—it was ratified in 2008—when some members adopted the Arab Charter on Human Rights.

The charter has an annex on the issue of Palestine. It affirms Palestinian independence and states that “even though the outward signs of this independence have remained veiled as a result of force majeure,” an Arab delegate from Palestine should “participate in the league’s work until this country enjoys actual independence.”

The Arab League has no mechanism to compel members’ compliance with its resolutions, a void that has led critics such as NYU Associate Professor Mohamad Bazzi to describe the organization as a “glorified debating society.” The charter states that decisions reached by a majority “shall bind only those states that accept them,” which places a premium on national sovereignty and limits the league’s ability to take collective action. While some actions are taken under the aegis of the Arab League, they are often executed only by a small faction. Bazzi says, “During the Lebanese civil war, the Arab League had limited success trying to help negotiate a peace, but in the end it was the individual powers, in this case Syria and Saudi Arabia, that helped end the conflict by convening the Taif Agreement. Technically it was under league auspices, but it was really Saudi Arabia and Syria as the driving force.”

6.2. Observer Missions, Sanctions, and Suspension

The Arab League utilizes observer missions, economic sanctions, and membership suspensions as its primary diplomatic tools to manage regional conflicts, mechanisms that gained unprecedented prominence during the Arab Spring uprisings. The most severe penalty the organization can enforce is the

suspension of a state's membership, which bars its representatives from attending meetings and participating in pan-Arab decision-making processes.

The most notable implementation of this measure occurred in November 2011, when the Arab League suspended Syria's membership and urged member nations to withdraw their ambassadors in response to President Bashar al-Assad's violent crackdown on anti-government protests, an isolation that lasted until the Arab League Council officially reinstated Syria in May 2023. Parallel to political isolation, the organization deploys observer missions to investigate human rights conditions, monitor truces, and evaluate government compliance with regional peace initiatives. This was exemplified in December 2011 when over 100 monitors were dispatched to Syria to oversee a peace plan demanding military withdrawal and the release of political prisoners; however, under intense criticism from opposition groups and facing a sharp spike in violence, the Arab League officially suspended the mission in January 2012 due to the critical deterioration of safety. When these diplomatic and monitoring efforts fail, the League resorts to economic and political sanctions, such as the strict package adopted against Syria in November 2011. These financial measures included freezing government assets, halting transactions with the Syrian Central Bank, imposing travel bans on senior officials, and suspending commercial flights between Syria and other member states.

While Syria remains the primary case study for the simultaneous deployment of all three mechanisms, the Arab League has also applied variations of these tools, including political suspensions and fact-finding delegations, to mediate power-sharing agreements and humanitarian crises in other conflict-ridden member states like Libya and Yemen.

6.3. Divisions Among Member States

The Arab League's ability to take unified action is historically crippled by deep geopolitical and ideological rifts among its twenty-two member states,

a structural weakness worsened by a charter dictating that council decisions are binding only on countries that vote for them.

The most prominent fracture line centers on relations with Israel, splitting the bloc between a normalization camp including Egypt, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Morocco; and a strict anti-normalization faction led by Algeria, Kuwait, Iraq, and Syria, who reject formal ties prior to Palestinian statehood.

Member states are also deeply divided over how to manage non-Arab regional heavyweights, as Gulf nations view Iran as an existential threat while Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria maintain close political ties with Tehran, preventing the activation of any joint defense mechanisms during escalations.

Bilateral and territorial rivalries further paralyze the League's chambers, exemplified by the decades-long dispute between Algeria and Morocco over the Western Sahara and Egypt's struggle to secure a binding pan-Arab ultimatum against Ethiopia regarding the Nile dam dispute.

Finally, governance ideologies and competing proxy interests entrench these divisions, as seen in the civil wars of Libya, Sudan, and Yemen where member states fund opposing military factions, as well as the highly contested debate that preceded Syria's eventual readmission to the bloc.

7. International and Regional Responses

Australia: Foreign Minister Kevin Rudd wrote an op-ed for The Australian published 20 May 2011 entitled Keep the faith with the Arab spring. Rudd compared the struggle of Arabs demonstrating for political reforms and democratisation to the sputtering pro-democracy movements within Australia's geographic proximity in Fiji, Indonesia and Myanmar, as well as more successful democratisation efforts in India, South Africa, and Turkey. He also indicated Australian support for the protesters, writing, The Arab democratic revolutions have made it clear that democracy is not something called for by the West. The call for democracy came resoundingly from

within and to the complete surprise of the outside world. Now the international community has a responsibility to stand in support of Arab citizens in their call for democracy, human rights and the rule of law... That is why countries like Australia take a long-term approach to supporting democracy.

Botswana: At a seminar on 16 June 2011 held by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Permanent Secretary of Defence, Justice and Security Segakweng Tsiane, representing the Botswana government, called the Arab Spring a wakeup call. She said the popular uprisings in Egypt, Tunisia, and other countries indicated that those governments did not do enough to accommodate the desires of their citizenry. Tsiane expressed dissatisfaction with the way the Arab Spring has manifested, however, saying that inclusive national dialogue would be preferable to uprisings.

Canada: Canadian daily The Globe and Mail has suggested that Canada's cautious approach toward the Arab Spring democracy movements is in contrast to many other G8 nations. Despite his stiff criticism of crackdowns by the Libyan, Syrian, and Yemeni governments, Prime Minister Stephen Harper said on 26 May that his government believed international aid to post-revolutionary countries should be provided by regional financial institutions such as the African Development Bank. Canada, he said, would not offer more direct financial assistance to countries revolutionised by the Arab Spring.

Eritrea: In an extended question-and-answer session posted on the Eritrean Ministry of Information website in late May and early June, President Isaias Afewerki said the events in the Arab world should be viewed as separate but inter-related, with corruption, socioeconomic stratification, and dependence on foreign governments being a factor common to many of the countries that experienced unrest. He blamed the United States for a Middle Eastern policy he said created chaos...in a creative way to further their aims and interests. He criticised external intervention in the affairs of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and other countries affected by the uprisings and said, The fact remains that every person must solve their own problems according to their own convictions and without any external interference. Afewerki suggested that at least some of the protests were sparked and fueled by the West, saying, These developments have served to teach a lesson to everyone about the wayward western policies in the last 20 years. He accused the West of attempting to create a New World

Order by manipulating organisations like the African Union and the Arab League into interfering with countries to Western countries' advantage.

France: Foreign Minister Alain Juppé spoke at the Arab World Institute for a symposium on the Arab Spring in Paris on 16 April. He took a tone of humility, acknowledging that the revolutionary wave came as a surprise to France and admitting, For too long we thought that the authoritarian regimes were the only bastions against extremism in the Arab world. Too long, we have brandished the Islamist threat as a pretext for justifying to an extent turning a blind eye on governments which were flouting freedom and curbing their country's development. Juppé compared the Arab Spring favourably to the Islamic Golden Age and said, We mustn't be afraid of this 'Arab Spring'. He said that while France does not have a policy of supporting regime change, it intends to speak up for human rights in the Arab world and back transitions to democracy in North Africa, a region with which France has historically had close ties. He expressed confidence in protesters and concluded the speech by saying he was hopeful about the outcome of the Arab Spring. President Nicolas Sarkozy urged G8 countries to agree on a financial aid package to post-revolutionary Egypt and Tunisia on 26 May in response to requests by the transitional authorities in Egypt and Tunisia for money.

Israel: On 14 April, Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman claimed that only economic stability would lead to political stability in the Arab world. He called the Arab Spring an opportunity for the Arab world to move to democracy and prosperity but emphasised that his government considers the security of Israel, with a history of political and ethnic tensions within the Muslim-majority Middle East, to be paramount.

Kazakhstan: Prime Minister Karim Masimov told Reuters on 2 April that his government is paying close attention to the protests and revolutions in the Middle East and North Africa. Masimov suggested that a lack of educational opportunities and social mobility, which he claimed were not major problems in Kazakhstan compared to in Egypt and Tunisia, had contributed to the revolutionary fervor gripping the Arab world. What is the biggest difference between them and us? Masimov asked rhetorically. People in Kazakhstan, the young generation in Kazakhstan, have hope and they have an opportunity to go forward. He admitted that

the Arab Spring highlighted political reforms needed in Astana and said Kazakhstan would transition peacefully toward democracy without experiencing the turmoil that the Arab world was going through.

Kyrgyzstan: On 8 June, President Roza Otunbayeva addressed the World Economic Forum in Vienna, and spoke briefly about the Arab Spring. Otunbayeva, who came to power as Kyrgyzstan's interim leader after the 2010 Kyrgyzstani revolution and presided during a parliamentary election that gave a counter-revolutionary party a plurality, said: After what happened in North Africa and the Middle East, slowly European countries started recognising that it's unacceptable, outrageous, that those dictators shoot their people, and urged other Central Asian countries to follow Kyrgyzstan's example or risk experiencing a revolution like those in Tunisia and Egypt.

Malaysia: In a speech on Islam and moderation in Oxford, England, on 17 May, Prime Minister Najib Razak touched on the events of the Arab Spring, noting the overwhelming pace and scale of the unrest in the Middle East and North Africa. He added, But amidst the chaos and the confusion we should not lose sight of the fact that these countries and peoples now face a fateful choice: the choice between extremism and intolerance ... and a peaceful, democratic moderation that will grant them more freedom of expression, not less. In stating Malaysia's support for the Palestinian nationalist movement, he pointedly added, In supporting the Palestinian and other righteous causes, Malaysia will not support violence against non-combatants, civilians, women, children, the aged and infirm. Najib suggested moderates could prevail in the Arab Spring and break the cycle of violence and oppression in the region, comparing the situation to the aftermath of the Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland, the Indian independence movement, and civil rights struggles in South Africa and the United States.

New Zealand: On 2 August, Foreign Affairs Minister Murray McCully expressed his government's optimism for a positive outcome to the Arab Spring, in his opinion; while also ultimately cautioning that this transition process will not be straightforward we cannot take the changes for granted. McCully remarked on the unexpected nature of the uprisings and said: What we do know is that we are now dealing with a series of very different leadership models and high expectations for a better future. While

elites remain unchanged in many countries, Arab leaders will have to become more responsive to their people. He also said New Zealand was engaging with Arab governments and had offered its diplomatic and economic support to transitional authorities in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia.

Russia: President Dmitri Medvedev voiced consternation over the Arab Spring on 14 June, telling his Uzbekistani counterpart President Islam Karimov that he hoped it would bring about an outcome that is clear and predictable for us. He said the revolutionary wave could destabilise Russia and its neighbours. On 14 July, he compared the Arab Spring to the fall of the Berlin Wall and said it proved that socioeconomic reforms, reforms that would take into account the interests of the widest majority of the population, must be carried out in due time.

Turkiye: At a summit in Istanbul in mid-March, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said the revolts in the region signified a popular demand for change. He warned that Arab governments would be well suited to be responsive to their people's demands and refrain from using violence or coercion. Erdoğan stressed that Turkey will not intervene in the affairs of other countries, but it will continue to offer sincere and constructive criticism.

United Kingdom: Prime Minister David Cameron expressed both enthusiasm and caution about the Arab Spring at the G8 meeting in late May 2011, offering financial assistance to post-revolutionary Egypt and Tunisia and saying, I want a very simple and clear message to come out of this summit, and that is that the most powerful nations on earth have come together and are saying to those in the Middle East and North Africa who want greater democracy, greater freedom, greater civil rights, we are on your side. On the other hand, the British government also criticised the attempted revolution in Bahrain, with the British ambassador to the country alleging Iranian support for those bent on violence in contrast to British attitudes towards the Arab spring in other countries. He warned that if Western governments did not provide aid, prolonged chaos in the region could breed Islamic extremism and accelerate the pace of immigration by North Africans to European countries, something Foreign Secretary William Hague said the UK believed to be unacceptable earlier in the month; however, with a note of caution; to be caught-amongst those supporting; & fighting against, greater involvement, with arab spring politics, in the

larger towns; & cities of the UK is not a moorish pleasure to be sipped; & savoured; its pretty heated debate.

Just a day after Cameron's remarks, The Observer reported that British officers were training snipers and elite security forces in Saudi Arabia that had been deployed to squelch protesters calling for reforms in Saudi Arabia as well as neighboring Bahrain. On 17 June, Hague described the Arab Spring as a more transformational event than the September 11 attacks of 2001 and claimed that the real nature of the Arab world is expressed in Tahrir Square, not at Ground Zero.

United States: On 19 May, President Barack Obama gave a foreign policy speech to an invited audience and members of the press at the State Department in regards to the Arab Spring. He contrasted the ideology of al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, recently killed by US Navy SEALs, with that of pro-democracy protesters in the Middle East and North Africa, saying: By the time we found bin Laden, al Qaeda's agenda had come to be seen by the vast majority of the region as a dead end, and the people of the Middle East and North Africa had taken their future into their own hands. Obama praised the demonstrators, comparing their efforts to bring about reform to the actions of the Boston Tea Party and Rosa Parks in American history. He criticized socioeconomic stratification in the Middle East, saying, The nations of the Middle East and North Africa won their independence long ago, but in too many places their people did not. In too many countries, power has been concentrated in the hands of the few. He added that through the moral force of non-violence, the people of the region have achieved more change in six months than terrorists have accomplished in decades. Obama also pledged to continue U.S. security policy in the region, but said he would also emphasize the opposition of the United States to violent and repressive governmental responses to the Arab Spring and its support for human rights and democratic reforms, claiming, Our support for these principles is not a secondary interest... It will be the policy of the United States to promote reform across the region, and to support transitions to democracy.

8. Core Issues of the Agenda

8.1. State Sovereignty and Regional Responsibility

During the Arab Spring (2011), the Arab League underwent a historic shift regarding state sovereignty, moving from its traditional adherence to non-interference toward a localized interpretation of the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP).

The founding Pact of the League of Arab States (1945) was strictly anchored in Westphalian state sovereignty, which historically forbade interference in the internal affairs of member states. However, the unprecedented humanitarian crises and uprisings of 2011 forced a regional responsibility to manage domestic turmoil.

The League took the unprecedented step of suspending Libya's membership and requested that the UN Security Council (UNSC) establish a no-fly zone, providing crucial regional legitimacy for the subsequent NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) intervention to protect civilians.

Shortly after, the League suspended Syria's membership (November 2011) and imposed political and economic sanctions in response to the Assad regime's violent crackdowns, representing a major questioning of traditional state sovereignty.

Despite this embrace of regional responsibility, the League's actions were heavily shaped by geopolitical realities rather than a consistent humanitarian doctrine. While the League acted against regimes in Libya and Syria, which was often driven by anti-Iran and anti-Syria axes led by Gulf states (primarily Saudi Arabia and Qatar), it remained largely silent or explicitly backed state crackdowns in places like Bahrain and Yemen.

By abandoning its absolute ban on intervention, the Arab League redefined the boundaries of regional security, though the organization was frequently paralyzed by internal divisions (such as differing national security priorities).

Ultimately, the limits of this regional responsibility became clear as the return to the status quo, evident when the League formally readmitted the Syrian regime (May 2023) to assert "strategic sovereignty," demonstrated that Westphalian sovereignty and regime preservation continued to trump humanitarian interventionism.

8.2. Government Repression and Human Rights

During the Arab Spring (2011), the Arab League underwent a radical yet inconsistent shift in how it responded to government repression and human rights violations by its own member states.

For decades, the League prioritized regime survival and strict non-interference over civil liberties, but the mass atrocities committed by states in 2011 forced the bloc to temporarily abandon its absolute protection of repressive governments.

This historic break from silence began in Libya (February 2011), where Muammar Gaddafi's lethal violence against peaceful protesters led the League to suspend Libya's delegation, explicitly condemn the government's systematic human rights abuses, and invite international intervention through the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to safeguard civilian lives.

As the most radical step of this call for international intervention, the Arab League supported UNSC Resolution 1970, which referred the situation in Libya to the International Criminal Court (ICC), paving the way for Muammar Gaddafi and his officials to be prosecuted for crimes against humanity; this move represented a historic departure from the bloc's traditional policy of shielding Arab leaders from international courts.

Shortly after, as Bashar al-Assad's forces heavily bombarded civilian areas in Syria (November 2011), the League suspended Syria's membership, launched an independent observer mission to monitor state violence, and imposed severe political and economic sanctions.

Despite this newfound commitment to human rights, the League's actions were deeply compromised by a severe double standard heavily dictated by the geopolitical interests of powerful Gulf states, primarily Saudi Arabia and Qatar.

While the League penalized Libya and Syria whose regimes aligned with Iran, it ignored or actively supported the brutal suppression of pro-democracy protesters in Western-aligned monarchies like Bahrain and Yemen.

By excusing the deployment of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) forces to crush the Bahraini uprising, the League weaponized human rights advocacy for political leverage rather than a consistent humanitarian doctrine.

Ultimately, the Arab League's temporary defense of human rights succumbed to structural limitations, such as a complete lack of judicial enforcement mechanisms, and a swift return to prioritizing regime security over accountability.

This retreat was firmly solidified by the formal readmission of Syria into the Arab League (May 2023), proving that the bloc continues to treat Westphalian sovereignty and regime preservation as far superior to protecting human rights against government repression.

8.3. Political Reform and Economic Instability

Historically, the League operated primarily as a political and diplomatic forum, leaving economic management to individual sovereign regimes and focusing regional economic initiatives on superficial trade agreements.

However, the 2011 uprising which driven heavily by high youth unemployment, soaring food inflation, and systemic corruption proved that regional security was deeply intertwined with economic stability and political transparency.

The initial outbreak of the Arab Spring paralyzed the League's institutional frameworks, as its wealthiest member states quickly realized that economic

discontent posed an existential threat to regime survival across the region. In response, a massive divergence emerged between the League's rhetorical support for political reform and the actual financial strategies deployed by its dominant powers.

To control the spreading instability, the Arab League supported the establishment of massive financial aid packages and regional development funds, primarily financed by wealthy Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) monarchies, which aimed to stabilize struggling regimes through economic bailouts rather than encouraging genuine democratic transition.

This financial interventionism was highly selective and strategically deployed to preserve the regional status quo. While the League formally passed resolutions encouraging vague institutional modernizations and economic revitalization, its primary financial heavyweights used targeted economic aid, central bank deposits, and fuel subsidies to stabilize friendly governments, such as Jordan, Morocco, and post-2013 Egypt, while deliberately withholding or weaponizing aid against adversarial regimes like Syria.

Furthermore, the economic devastation caused by the subsequent civil conflicts in Syria, Libya, and Yemen highlighted the total inadequacy of the Arab League's internal economic institutions, such as the Council of Arab Economic Unity. The bloc lacked the structural mechanisms, financial reserves, and developmental frameworks necessary to implement comprehensive regional economic reforms or rebuild shattered infrastructure, leaving transition states completely dependent on Western international financial institutions or unilateral Gulf aid.

8.4. Civilian Protection and Humanitarian Assistance

The unfolding of the 2011 Arab Spring confronted the League of Arab States with an unprecedented operational and normative crisis regarding civilian protection and the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

Historically, the regional body prioritized regime security and the absolute sanctuary of state sovereignty over humanitarian imperatives, leaving it structurally unequipped to manage mass internal displacement or state-sponsored violence against populations. The severe civilian casualties generated by domestic crackdowns forced an ideological rupture within the organization, leading to a temporary and highly selective embrace of humanitarian interventionism.

The most defining institutional shift occurred in response to the escalating violence in Libya, where the regime's explicit threats against its own citizens prompted an unprecedented regional reaction.

By formally endorsing United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973, the Arab League actively legitimized the establishment of a no-fly zone and the deployment of international military assets explicitly tasked with civilian protection, marking the first time the bloc sanctioned external humanitarian intervention against a fellow member state.

This proactive stance, however, contrasted sharply with the operational paralysis that plagued the League's subsequent humanitarian endeavors in Syria. In late 2011, the organization attempted to deploy the Arab League Observer Mission to oversee the cessation of hostilities and ensure the safe delivery of medical aid to besieged urban centers. The initiative collapsed rapidly due to a lack of logistical expertise, severe obstruction by the Syrian state apparatus, and the absence of an independent peacekeeping framework, underscoring the League's structural incapacity to enforce humanitarian corridors without external international backing.

Furthermore, the allocation of humanitarian assistance throughout the crisis was heavily compromised by the geopolitical agendas of the League's dominant financial powers, particularly the Gulf monarchies. Rather than establishing a centralized, neutral regional relief mechanism, humanitarian aid was largely channeled through unilateral state networks, effectively weaponizing relief funds to support specific armed factions or allied political transitions while withholding assistance from adversarial regimes.

Ultimately, the Arab League's engagement with civilian protection during the Arab Spring revealed a profound disconnect between temporary political alignment and institutionalized humanitarian capability. The organization's swift retreat from these protective norms—culminating in the eventual normalization of relations with regimes responsible for widespread civilian displacement—demonstrates that the brief prioritization of humanitarian assistance was an exceptional geopolitical instrument rather than a permanent systemic evolution toward human security.

9. Committee Process and Procedure

In the Arab league representatives are going to discuss how to solve the problems which occur from the Arab Spring. The sessions will go by semi moderated caucuses for most of the time to make debates. When the discussions have been made the league will start to write directives to take actions. There will be updates upon the directives and time. To make a finalization of the league the representatives are going to write a communique for the summarization of the debates and actions.

The time set will be settled when a man named Mohamed Bouazizi, a 26-year-old Tunisian street vendor, set himself on fire on December 17, 2010, outside a local governor's office in Sidi Bouzid, Tunisia. His act of self-immolation—prompted by the confiscation of his produce and the humiliation he suffered from municipal officials—ignited the Tunisian Revolution and became the catalyst for the wider Arab Spring.

Directives And Types Of Directives

What is a Directive?

A crisis is a specialized committee that replicates decision-making during a crisis.

Individual delegates or members provide directives to guide their actions and

responses to the crisis. Delegates use directives to propose specific courses of action, tactics, or policies to handle the situation.

Depending on the committee structure, and the course of actions currently happening in the committee, these directives can take many forms, such as Individual, Joint, Committee, Intelligence, Top Secret Directive, and Press Release.

Individual Directive:

When an action is within your character's authority or is achievable due to their abilities, you write personal commands. To begin, there is a format for writing directives; so, you must state who is sending the directive and to whom it is being sent (from, to). Following that, whose cabinet is sending the directive, followed by the time and current date of the committee. Finally, the format of your directive and its title. That's all there is to it; this is the only format you need to know to write a directive. The only thing left is the content of your directive, and the way through which you compose it is fairly simple; You write it by answering the what, why, when, who, where, and, most crucially, how questions. You write the action you want to take by answering the WH questions and then elaborating and discussing it as much as possible to make your plan as thorough as feasible. Also, whenever possible, employ the future tense.

On paper, a directive looks like this:

From: Zeynel Abidin Bin Ali
Date: 17 December 2010

Personal Directive

To: Related Authorities
Time: 12.34

Our Countries' Action

What:

Why:

When:

Who:

Where:

How*:

(keep in mind you don't actually need to give us headers that say 'what' or 'when' etc. Just make sure it's all in the text.)

Joint Directive:

Directives written by more than one individual are considered joint directives. You write joint directives when you can only achieve your purpose in the directive by utilizing the authority of other musicians. Everything else is the same.

Committee Directive:

A committee directive is written when you wish to use everyone's authority or when you are about to deliver your final directive (in most cases). You write the committee directive with your committee; the formal name is "Committee Directive".

Intelligence Directive:

You write intelligence directives when you want to acquire the necessary information about you or your musician. The format is exactly the same, except for the "WH Questions" part. For example:

From: Muammer Kaddafi	Intelligence Directive	Date:
17 December 2010		
To: Crisis Team/Chairboard	My Relations with NATO	
Time: 16.21		

Top Secret:

Top Secret directives are those that your chair is not allowed to read. You hand over your Top Secret directive to the admin. They are written precisely the same, but you must fold your paper and write "TOP SECRET" on the back side of it. But we don't recommend writing Top Secret Directives unless you're planning on writing a brilliant 10-page long directive, because failing to do so will backfire much worse. Furthermore, updates to the Top Secret Directives are only sent to the person who sent them, unless they directly affect the other members.

Tour De Table

In Model United Nations (MUN) crises committees, "tour de table" is a term used to describe a specific procedure or phase of the committee session. It is a French term that translates to "turn of the table" in English.

During a tour de table, each delegate representing a country or entity in the committee takes turns speaking and sharing their country's or entity's stance, opinions, or proposed actions on the crisis at hand. This process allows all delegates to express their views and contribute to the discussion in a structured and organized manner.

Tour de table is often used at the beginning of a crisis/special committee session or at crucial points during the committee's work to gauge the positions and perspectives of each delegation. It helps set the stage for further debate, collaboration, and negotiation among delegates as they work to find solutions to the crisis. In a typical tour de table, the chair or moderator of the committee will go around the room or call upon delegates in a

specific order to speak. Each delegate is given a limited time (usually around 1-2 minutes) to make their statement. This process ensures that all countries or entities have an equal opportunity to be heard and participate actively in the committee's discussions.

Semi-Moderated Caucus: Unlike moderated caucuses, delegates in a semi-moderated caucus are allowed to speak without the chair's permission, as long as they do not interrupt other members and treat each other with respect.

Unmoderated Caucus: In an unmoderated caucus, delegates are free to draft any kind of paper they want to achieve their goals, and support others. The majority of the committee's time should be spent on unmoderated caucuses rather than semi-moderated.

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